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ABSTRACT
Technological disasters, since its origin in the Industrial Revolution, are 
part of the reality of society, with frequent losses from the loss of lives to 
the compromise of ecosystem services. These events carry the lesson that 
the development of technologies must be accompanied by the diagnosis 
of their risks through the balance between knowledge and safety, the 
likelihood and potentiality of their damages. In this context, the article 
aims initially at narrating the disaster of Bhopal in Sheila Jasanoff and, in 
the second moment to analyze the disasters under the systemic aspect that 
marks the society of risk. Therefore, we will use bibliographical research 
and the systemic-constructivist matrix as a methodology to demonstrate 
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the complexity surrounding disaster risk prevention strategies, taking into 
account technology transfer between states and pre-existing vulnerabilities. 
 
Keywords: disasters; Bhopal; technological risks; right to know. 
O DESASTRE DE BHOPAL: RISCOS E VULNERABILIDADES NA 
TRANSFERÊNCIA DE TECNOLOGIAS E O DIREITO DE SABER 
Resumo: Os desastres tecnológicos, desde sua origem na Revolução 
Industrial, fazem parte da realidade da sociedade, com frequentes 
prejuízos que partem da perda de vidas ao comprometimento de serviços 
ecossistêmicos. Estes eventos trazem a lição de que o desenvolvimento 
das tecnologias deve vir acompanhado pelo diagnóstico de seus riscos, 
mediante o contrapeso entre o conhecimento e a segurança, entre a 
probabilidade e potencialidade de seus danos. Diante deste contexto, o 
artigo objetiva inicialmente narrar o desastre de Bhopal, em Sheila Jasanoff 
e, num segundo momento, analisar os desastres sob o aspecto sistêmico 
que marca a sociedade de risco. Diante disso, se utilizará da pesquisa 
bibliográfica e da matriz sistêmico-construtivista como metodologia, a fim 
de demonstrar a complexidade que circunda as estratégias de prevenção 
de riscos de desastres, tendo em conta a transferência de tecnologia entre 
Estados e as vulnerabilidades preexistentes. 
Palavras-chave: desastres; Bhopal; riscos tecnológicos; direito de saber. 
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INTRODUCTION
 
Modern society experiences AN exposure to unprecedented 
technological risks that have materialized themselves in disasters with 
a high power of destruction. Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Gulf 
of Mexico (2010), Fukushima (2011) and Mariana (2015) are the best 
known worldwide. All these events are due to the economic models of 
dynamic production that, connected by globalization, have facilitated agile 
development. On the other hand, the deficiency in the management of the 
risks involved generates serious human and environmental damages that 
are pulverized in space and perpetuate in time. 
In this scenario, anthropogenic (caused by human action) 
disasters of technological (chemical) nature, produce the containment of 
their catalyst. Given their technological initiative, they allow and require 
risk management for the prevention of the event causing the disaster, unlike 
natural disasters (geological, climatological, meteorological, biological) 
that do not allow control at the beginning of the event, but only after the 
consequences appear (emergency response, mitigation and repair). 
With these considerations in mind, this article will deal with the 
technological (chemical) disaster of Bhopal, which occurred on December 
3, 1984, one of the most important in history. The initial objective is to 
narrate the causes and consequences of this disaster, bringing the necessary 
support, in a second moment, to understand the environmental disasters 
in the society of risk. With this theoretical framework, the objective 
is to demonstrate the importance and parameters of risk analysis and 
vulnerability in disasters caused by transfers of technologies between 
states and the “right to know” as an important consideration for prevention 
and disaster mitigation. 
To do so, based on the systemic theory of Niklas Luhmann, the 
article will use bibliographical research and the systemic-constructivist 
matrix as methodology, in order to demonstrate the complexity of the 
society of risks, which comprises disasters for its prevention strategies. 
Therefore, the problem to be faced is the importance of analyzing the 
risks faced by the vulnerabilities of the location reached, the transfer 
of technology between states and the role that the “right to know” may 
represent in this scenario. 
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The hypothesis of solution of the problem, based on the systemic 
theory, will be based initially on the demonstration of the paradigm between 
economic development and the risks of technology. These, contextualized, 
allow the understanding of vulnerabilities, from which it is possible to 
construct the necessary notes for the dissemination of information (“right 
to know”) in the prevention and mitigation of technological risks. 
Thus, in the first topic will be approached the disaster of Bhopal 
under the phatic bias, that is, its causes and consequences. In the second 
item will be analyzed the particularities of the society of risk with regard 
to the risks of anthropogenic disasters in the transfer of technologies 
between states, when there are vulnerabilities. The third topic will deal 
with the right to know, based on Sheila Jasanoff’s studies, specifically on 
the understanding of vulnerabilities and the need for information, through 
the “right to know” in preventing the risks of human and environmental 
damage. 
 
1 THE BHOPAL DISASTER1
 
At dawn on Dec. 3, 1984, in Bhopal, India, a toxic cloud blanketed 
the city sky and spread through the villages around the Union Carbide 
pesticide factory. The factory was set up in the capital of Madhya Pradesh 
in the 1970s. The disaster has caused diseases, deaths, contamination of 
ecosystem services, and questions about their causes and consequences. 
The disaster turned 30 in 2014. In the search to understand the facts that 
contributed to the occurrence of this disaster and its consequences, it is 
important to realign its past and future events. 
Union Carbide was established with the possibility of generating 
income and jobs, and thus the community of the city and the region was 
receptive, given the precarious conditions in which they lived. At the 
beginning of its facilities, the plant was frequently visited by professionals 
from the American matrix, in view of the large profits made with the sale of 
the “Sevin” insecticide (now owned by Bayer), produced from “carbaryl”, 
discovered by Union Carbide, which was commercialized in 1958. 
After a few years of implementation, a rival company settled 
nearby, which led to a decrease in sales of agrochemicals by Union Carbide. 
1 Information about the disaster was taken from: JASANOFF, Sheila. The Bhopal disaster and the right 
to know. InSoc. Sci. Med., vol. 27, n. 10, 1988, p. 1113-1123. 
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In order to resume sales and reduce maintenance costs, the company has 
reduced its staff, laid off former supervisors and hired others with less 
experience. In 1982, inspectors from the parent company found that 
worker training in Bhopal was insufficient. Also, that there were numerous 
technical failures, equipment problems and maintenance. The partner 
of the company left the decisions of the Bhopal plant on security issues 
under the autonomy of the Bhopal factory. However, in the face of the 
precariousness of diagnosis, the imported (from a developed country) way 
of producing, managing and organizing was no longer compatible with the 
working conditions of the importing (from an underdeveloped country). 
From then on, the leaders of Union Carbide, the American 
headquarters and Indian subsidiary, discussed the maintenance of the 
Bhopal plant. Local leaders feared the lack of jobs and income for the 
people who lived there, considering that the majority of the neighboring 
population depended on the work in the company. As a result, the decision 
was to maintain the factory. 
At this point, it is essential to quote Beck’s lesson that progress 
replaces consensus and also replaces questioning how ends justify means 
with unknown or inconsiderate consequences. In other words, “the devil 
of the economy must cross the holy water of public morality and adopt 
an appearance of saint in relation to social foresight and nature” (BECK, 
1998, p. 238). 
Soon after the decision to continue the operation of the company, 
the disaster occurred. The methyl isocyanate was discharged into the open 
air for lack of maintenance in the machinery. It was estimated that 40 tons 
of gas was dispersed by the plant pipe, reaching much of the population of 
Bhopal. 
To clarify, methyl isocyanate (MIC) at 0 ° C and under the 
pressure of 2. 4 liquid bar. At the time of the accident, the pressure of 
the storage tanks rose to more than 14bar and the temperature of the 
reservoirs approached 200ºC. The probable cause of increased pressure 
and temperature was attributed to the inflow of water into one of the tanks, 
causing a highly exothermic reaction. The vapors emitted, under controlled 
conditions, would be neutralized in the purification towers. However, one 
of these towers was deactivated, which led to the release of the product in 
gaseous form, “pure”, and highly lethal (JASANOFF, 1998, p. 1113-1123). 
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It was estimated that 8,000 (eight thousand) people died as a 
direct consequence of the gas leak. The initial symptoms reported were: 
severe head and stomach pains, burning eyes, burning of the airways, 
dehydration, vomiting, loss of consciousness and, in many cases, instant 
death (JASANOFF, 1998, p. 1113-1123). 
The disaster caused, in addition to immediate victims, 
transgenerational victims, since, after more than thirty years, people are 
still born with genetic diseases, degenerative diseases, physical deformities, 
eye diseases, brain damage, among others. The chair of generations of 
animals has also been damaged, with deformities and genetic diseases. 
The contamination reached even the groundwater, reflecting on the health 
of the population, since the food grown on the site was also damaged, 
generating a chain of damages. 
Before the event, the causes pointed to its occurrence were: plant 
installed in a populous place; absence of contingency plan; technology not 
related to the degree of development (economic, social, legal) of the place; 
workers without qualification; failure in storage and access to methyl 
isocyanate (MIC); large amount of stored chemicals; unrestricted access to 
chemicals; products without prior solid knowledge; ineffective legislation in 
Medhya Pradesh; precariousness and inefficiency of emergency assistance 
to victims; lack of safety / health control of workers and the population; 
damage to important machinery in the process of manufacturing pesticides 
(cooler and purifier); lack of information and knowledge about the MIC, 
besides the inappropriate use of the MIC and the lack of command and 
control instruments (JASANOFF, 1998, p. 1113-1123). 
According to Morone and Woodhouse, the volume of this list 
of errors is reminiscent of the “Three Mile Island” accident (TMI). The 
difference between the two disasters is that the IMT had disaster control 
systems that prevented serious health effects for people, while in Bhopal 
thousands died or were injured / sick / intoxicated. Thus, although the 
chemical industry in the United States is largely self-regulating, most 
domestic plants employ relatively sophisticated security tactics, but are 
often not installed in the subsidiaries (MORONE; WOODUSE, 1998). 
Following the disaster, in the words of Jasanoff, Union Carbide did 
not assume responsibility for the damages. It paid only to the government 
of India, after five years of judicial dispute, a derisory indemnity in the face 
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of the seriousness of the contamination. Union Carbide was incorporated 
by Dow Chemical (MORONE; WOODHOUSE, 1998). 
India’s attempts to transfer legal sanctions for the failure of the 
Bhopal plant back to the risk-exporting country proved itself to be arduous. 
The lawsuit filed by the Indian government on behalf of the victims of 
Bhopal has never gone to trial. Instead, after the judicial discussion on 
where the case should be tried, the matter was settled in favor of Union 
Carbide, designating the Indian justice as competent, then the plaintiff 
of the action (Government of India) on behalf of the citizens accepted 
the proposed $470,000,000 from the Union Carbide agreement in May 
1989. This agreement not only put an end to all pending claims against 
Union Carbide, resulting from the gas leak, but also brought an end to 
investigations into the facts (JASANOFF, 2008). 
Deva mentions that the Bhopal disaster killed more than 20,000 
people, among other medical problems and environmental degradation. 
The catastrophic event not only exposed the limitations of legal norms 
in the accountability of a multinational company for a number of human 
rights violations, but also triggered the change of laws and the evolution of 
new legal principles (DEVA, 2012). 
Thus, along the lines of Jasanoff’s studies, dependency relations 
were inscribed twice. Not only did India need to import innovations from 
Union Carbide regarding the technology for producing agrochemicals, but 
Indian courts also had to accept the conceptual framework of US corporate 
law in the mode of control (PATEL; PETLAKH, 2014). 
Finally, from the description of the Bhopal disaster, it is possible 
to understand the security flaws represented in the risks, as well as the 
preexisting vulnerabilities in the place that increased the human and 
environmental damage at the time. That said, in order to meet the objectives 
of this article, it is important to understand the society from the systemic 
view and its reflections about the events of disasters from the transfer of 
technology. 
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2 THE DISASTERS OF RISK SOCIETY IN THE TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGIES BETWEEN STATES
 
Initially, it should be mentioned that the event in Bhopal 
was not exclusive; in addition to countless other disasters in different 
technologies, the transfer of technologies between states is the subject 
of recurrent discussion. Many people in India, especially those who live 
in rural areas, do not have adequate knowledge, making them an easy 
target for exploitation. As the author Deva mentions, Indian society is 
a “survival society” (DEVA, 2012). In the same sense, in Mexico, there 
are no regulations for the protection of workers exposed to asbestos; the 
levels of dust in Mexican factories are not monitored, and workers do 
not use specific safety equipment (respirators). Employees receive only 
the minimum wage and are not informed about the dangers they face in 
carrying out the work (JASANOFF, 2008). 
Morone and Woodhouse cite other cases, such as that of Dow 
Chemical (company that bought Union Carbide) and Chevron, which used 
the third world as a “dump” for hazardous chemicals, especially DDT 
(agricultural defense widely used worldwide)). For example, Ortho (a 
division of Chevron and a Standard Oil of California) in Costa Rica is the 
main importer of eight banned or severely restricted pesticides: “paration”, 
“DDT”, “aldrin”, “dieldrin “,” Heptachlor “,” chlordane “,” endrin “and” 
benzenehexa-chloro “(BHC). In Ecuador, Shell, Velsicol, Bayer, American 
Cyanamid, Hercules and Monsanto are the major importers of pesticides 
banned in the United States. In Colombia, fourteen different companies 
import practically all agrochemicals banned in the United States since 
1970 (MORONE; WOODUSE, 1998). 
Morone and Woodhouse suggest that the fundamental moral 
problem raised by Bhopal can be translated into these questions: Are 
companies obliged to ensure equal protection against risks across national 
boundaries? Are companies only required to provide the protection 
required by the law of the country receiving the technology? (MORONE; 
WOODHOUSE, 1998). 
The ideal scenario would be that the development process 
would be transparent, participatory and humane, with participation of 
all stakeholders in the business decision-making process (DEVA, 2012). 
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On the contrary, “transfers of dangerous technologies are based on the 
fact that risk assessment in developed countries is isolated and separated 
from analogous moral requirements in developing countries,” unleashing 
what the authors call “isolationist strategy. “That is, transfers of risk 
technologies to other countries occur frequently, but recipients impose 
security conditions or sanctions, which are, however, “typically minimal 
or non-existent”. (MORONE; WOODHOUSE, 1998). 
Therefore, risks arising from technologies as well as those involving 
chemicals should be investigated, evaluated and managed considering 
their probability and magnitude of causing serious environmental damage 
(BERWIG, 2015, p. 211-233). Reactions of the various other chemicals, as 
well as air, water, under different control conditions, may generate other 
damages or even cause a damage amplifier effect. 
As a consequence, risk analysis must be incorporated into 
development processes that logically can disadvantage some sectors of 
society. In this regard, it is essential, in taking stock of pros and cons, 
that the government properly consider the interests of those affected by 
development projects, in addition to expanding and strengthening the 
scope of human and environmental impact assessment. The State should 
not relinquish its duty to protect only the interests of the business sector 
(DEVA, 2012). 
Jasanoff records that the Bhopal disaster reveals “the human 
costs of globalization,” and that this disaster also illustrated the inability 
of law and science to restore order after the result of the radical clash 
between different cultures, knowledge and justice of the implantation of 
the American technology in Indian soil) (JASANOFF, 2008). Morone and 
Woodhouse mention that the risks of technology transfer are viewed by 
large companies as disengagement, not being responsible for the protection 
of all people, but the recipient state. That is to say, in setting up in another 
State, because of the benefits, they would have no responsibility with 
regard to safety (MORONE; WOODHOUSE, 1998). 
Another thesis defended is that of consent. That is, even if 
the risk transferred may threaten personal safety, it is argued that the 
beneficiaries of the technology consented. This thesis rests, in part, on 
the classical economic theory of compensation wages, because when 
people take positions of risk to receive higher wages, they are implicitly 
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accepting them. By analogy, proponents of the consent argument argue 
that institutionalizing greater public health risks is acceptable because 
citizens voluntarily agree to trade some security for greater public benefits 
such as a stronger economy or a better standard of living. (MORONE; 
WOODHOUSE, 1998). 
While there are theories in favor of accepting risks in exchange for 
economic and / or social benefits, this point of view must be analyzed with 
due accuracy. This is because, although especially in developing countries, 
the desire for material prosperity is significant, this does not mean that 
workers, the population and the environment are willing to submit to risks 
and suffer losses and harm Human Rights. In Beck’s line, the transfer of 
Union Carbide’s technology to the Bhopal plant was no coincidence; what 
happened was a “pulling force” between extreme poverty and extreme 
risks, in a place where the needy and unemployed population was more 
receptive to technology, which was seen as an opportunity for work and 
prosperity (BECK, 1998, p. 48-53). 
The conflicts arising from the distribution of wealth are replaced 
by the problems arising from the production, definition and distribution of 
technical and scientific risks. The process of modernization, then, becomes 
reflexive and fails to focus on the questions of application of technologies 
and becomes concerned with their management (BECK, 1998, pp. 25-26). 
According to Georgi, underdeveloped countries are only 
considered so from the perspective of the developed countries. While 
they impose their policies by virtue of their economic power, they may 
legitimately have as their development objective the maintenance of 
underdevelopment in other countries (GEORGI, 1994, p. 45-54). Thus, 
in the case analyzed, as the local population was not aware of the risks, 
Bhopal’s choice was indeed the “best” for the American company, since 
“the evidence of misery hinders the perception of risks” (BECK, 1998, p. 
51). Also, the threat of job loss served as a pretext to increase production 
and thereby the emission of industrial waste and the failure to research and 
publicize its toxic effects. 
Risk production and ignorance of its effects find an interest in 
the advantages of productivity, or, according to Habermas, an increasingly 
productive interest in knowledge (HABERMAS, 1975, p. 291-302). In this 
sense, Georgi (1994, p. 49). points out that:
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Modern society is characterized by its great capacity to control indeterminations. 
And thus, of its production. This paradox adds to the need for protection and security. 
It is the need to act so that the indeterminations do not acquire structure value: the 
need to prevent the deviation from stabilizing. Let’s say it is the need to avoid that 
lower-grade normality, which flows below the normalcy we know when reason is 
in tune with time. This lower grade normality produces insecurity. Of course, as 
the certainty grows that the indeterminations that enter again into the sphere of this 
second normality can be imputed to the decisions, search for other decisions. 
 
Thus, the objective of modern society, based on development 
without the monitoring of risk management, has already been proven 
inefficient, given the potential human and environmental damages that can 
be caused. Therefore, disasters, given their magnitude and complexity, with 
the achievement of a large part of a society, various goods and services, are 
considered as systemic events. Given this perspective, the theory developed 
by Niklas Luhmann proves to be effective for understanding disasters and 
seeking ways to prevent (BERWIG, 2015, p. 32-33). 
Thus, from the systemic view of Luhmann, society presents itself 
with the characteristics of a system, allowing the understanding of social 
phenomena through the interdependence bonds that unite them and constitute 
them in a totality. Subsequently, society is formed by several functionally 
differentiated systems, which are connected by communication. The limits 
of society are the limits of communication; since it is no longer possible 
to isolate itself within society by virtue of communication, modern society 
constitutes itself as global (ROCHA, 2007, p. 51). 
The process of modernization made the social system even more 
complex and multifaceted, and it was no longer able to control itself. The 
process, then, is applied to itself, since society lives under the absolute 
control of the modernization of industry. This modernization, however, by 
virtue of its autonomization, subtracts from itself the very foundations. It 
is born, then, a second modern age, which is the risk society. This society 
begins where the social norms systems that promise security fail because 
of the inability to control the threats that come from decisions in the face 
of new challenges. The threats are diverse, of an ecological, technological 
and political nature (GEORGI, 1994, p. 45). 
The answer to these facts lies in the imminent preoccupation with 
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the accumulation of power of the technological-economic “progress” 
that increasingly overshadows the production of risks. In this respect, it 
can be said that late modernity and the social production of wealth were 
systematically accompanied by the social production of risks (BECK, 
2010, p. 23). In this equation, velocity is directly proportional to the 
risk production. These events, which stem from disordered growth, are 
actually generating risks to society, with effects that establish links with 
the future, that is, consequences borne by future generations (BERWIG, 
2015, p. 28). These facts are clearly seen in the Bhopal disaster, where the 
social vulnerability presented by underdevelopment was the fuel for the 
accelerated and careless pursuit of development. 
Thus, in the risk society, disasters are becoming increasingly 
common, which is why there must be adequate legal guidance to ensure that 
disasters are regulated and predicted, as well as to be covered in command 
and control actions for risks, that is, the legislation should be extensive and 
comprehensive. As advocated by Farber, Law (Environmental) requires 
a complex, multifaceted process that demands a systematic approach. 
Moreover, according to the author, disasters represent a global problem, so 
solutions must be equally transnational (FARBER, 2012, p. 2-15). 
In addition, according to Carvalho, “the current situation is 
bringing us to a normalization of the consequences of that social format 
(Post-Industrial Society), that is to say, we face the concretization of 
neglected risks, in a normalization of disasters” (CARVALHO, 2013). 
Beck, in this sense, mentions that innovations are projected without their 
consequences being considered, since they are often not even known 
(BECK, 1998, p. 241):
Las ciências experimentales, al proyectar innovaciones, quedan separadas en 
su concepción y en su relación institucional de las consecuencias técnicas y de 
las consecuencias de las consecuencias que genaran. El desconocimiento de las 
consecuencias y la ausencia de responsabilidad forman parte del programa de 
desarollo de la ciencia. El potencial transformador de la modernidad empieza a 
resquebrajarse por los “efectos secundários latentes”, que, por una parte, generalizan 
los riesgos para la existência y, por otra, actualizan lo que era latente. Lo que no 
vemos ni queremos sienpre cambia el mundo clara y amenazadoramente. 
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In the case of the Bhopal disaster, the lack of organization in the 
plant was evident, even before the fateful one occurred. In Beck’s line, the 
division of labor would be a general irresponsibility. The causes of accidents 
have been diluted within the working system, each stage of production 
being a cause and also an effect. Thus, the idea of  the system in the analysis 
of risks is extremely valid for the perception that “se puede hacer algo y 
seguir haciéndolo sin tener que responsabilizarse personalmente de ello 
(...) Se actúa fisicamente sin actuar moral y políticamente. (...). De este 
modo se busca un culpable a la vista del inminente desastre ecológico.” 
(BECK, 1998, p. 39). 
According to Farber (2010), disasters, in addition to what has 
been mentioned, are potentiated due to the economic interdependence 
between companies of the same or another State, the social and economic 
vulnerability of workers and the population of developing countries, 
occupation of risk areas and the commitment of essential sectors, as a 
result of the absence of inventories, as Carvalho and Damacena also point 
out (2013, p. 56)
From this perspective, the risk of damage is unevenly distributed; 
in general, cheap residential areas are located in the vicinity of industrial 
areas; On the other hand, risks do not nullify, but strengthen class society 
(BECK, 1998, p. 39). In the case of Bhopal, this was what happened: the 
workers lived close to it, vulnerability being the crucial factor for the great 
extent of the consequences of the disaster. 
According to Carvalho and Damacena (2013, p. 47), using 
the systemic theory of Luhmann, the combination of factors causes 
“compromise of systemic stability”, repercussions on social stability, 
generating “irradiation and feedback of its causes and political 
contextually (economic, political, legal, scientific). “ Thus, in Bhopal, lack 
of knowledge, information, training, maintenance of machinery, adequate 
treatment of the victims, added to the vulnerability of the local population, 
caused a worsening of the damages due to the irradiation and feedback of 
the catastrophic results of the disaster. 
It adds to this the fact that disaster triggers a series of effects 
over time, which may be in minor magnitude of the initial catastrophe, in 
numbers but not less important (SMITH, 2005). In the object of this study 
this characteristic is strongly marked by the consequences of the disaster, 
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which caused many immediate deaths, but also deaths and later illnesses. 
It also caused the damage to ecosystem services in the short, medium and 
long term and to the health of people and animals, before the birth of beings 
with deformities and mental problems. 
Disaster design focuses on “unexpected” and significant events 
in terms of loss of human lives and material losses (CARVALHO; 
DAMACENA, 2013, p. 22). But, as Dauber points out, “’disaster’ is, in 
practice, a malleable term. “ Disasters are often seen as unexpected and 
surprising. However, they should be expected and prevented through the 
effective use of available information, communication and knowledge by 
the actors involved (DAUBER, 1998, p. 967). 
In response to this, Farber (2010) argues that effective disaster 
risk management planning must account for “acts of nature […] 
weaknesses of human nature, and... effects of technology. “ Besides, it 
should be considered that disaster damage cannot be seen as random, but 
as a reflection of society’s failure to adequately mitigate risks (FARBER, 
2012, p. 2)
Taking this analysis, the present point aimed to analyze the causes 
of the environmental disaster in Bhopal and in what way this disaster can 
be interpreted from the systemic theory of Niklas Luhmann. In this sense, 
it was verified that the disaster of Bhopal was due to a series of facts, 
which, combined with the vulnerability of the local population for the 
ignorance of the risks, had their damages potentialized when the fires of 
the technological disaster. 
 
3 LEARNING FROM BHOPAL DISASTER: THE RIGHT TO 
KNOW
 
Soon after the Bhopal disaster, the discussion about the risks 
of technology transfer between states and the need for information 
about products, technologies and risks became more present. One of 
these articles, entitled “The Bhopal Disaster and the Right to Know,” 
(JASANOFF, 1988, pp. 1113-1123) by the Indian Sheila Jasanoff, aimed to 
address the obstacles to the creation of efficient information policies when 
technologies are transferred beyond the borders of the States. The article 
reached world-wide fame, since it approached the theme of the disaster 
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with great propriety, and, thus, was chosen to serve as base for the present 
article. 
Turner suggests that the information necessary to prevent disasters 
is of four orders: 1) totally unknown: it is not known how to prevent; 2) 
known but not fully appreciated; 3) known, but not analyzed and evaluated 
together with other information, at the appropriate time, or 4) possible to 
be known, however, cannot be appreciated because there is still not enough 
knowledge, or because there is no case to apply them (JASANOFF, 1988, 
pp. 1113-1123). That is, the information rightly enshrines the importance 
of knowledge about the risks involved in a given activity, in favor of the 
demonopolization of scientific or technical information. Therefore, this 
connects with the possibility of participation in the prevention of risks and 
damages (CARVALHO; DAMACENA, 2013, p. 44-45). 
In Bhopal, information was of the second order. That is, many 
experts could have contributed to the prevention or mitigation of disaster 
damage through knowledge about: the toxicity and reactivity of methyl 
isocyanate, the risks of the on-site production of agrochemicals, the 
conditions of the operation in the plant and how to deal with a catastrophe 
involving methyl isocyanate. On the contrary, ignorance and lack of 
information coexisted with the apparently deliberate knowledge and desire 
to avoid responsibility for knowledge (JASANOFF, 1988, p. 1113-1123). 
Thus, the chemical disaster in Bhopal has raised the issue of the 
right to know, the right to information, the right to knowledge, with the aim 
of re-adjusting legislation so that those involved could have information 
about the use of dangerous technologies. 
From the experience of Bhopal, the author intended to answer 
questions regarding the right to know. Initially, it establishes that those 
who have the right to know about operations that could cause harm are 
those directly exposed to risks: employees and society. These people did 
not have the opportunity to make a choice in accepting or rejecting risks. 
In the same way, the information would have made possible precautionary 
measures on the part of them (JASANOFF, 1988, pp. 1113-1123). 
Deva argues that the Bhopal disaster could have been avoided, or 
at least had much smaller consequences, if people had access to the correct 
information to take appropriate preventive measures (DEVA, 2012). Thus, 
knowledge would also help the government, doctors and nurses, police, 
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firemen and others responsible for emergency care and help those affected. 
In this case, physicians had no knowledge of emergency procedures, 
emergency care and medications to treat workers and the population that 
was affected by the gas leak. They had to deal with the victims without 
knowing what they needed to alleviate the suffering resulting from the 
poisoning (JASANOFF, 1988, p. 1113-1123). 
Bhopal has made discussions about the right to know seen as 
important, including the right of people in developing countries to become 
aware of the technologies employed by foreign companies in their territory. 
Therefore, information about risks should be made available to workers and 
the population in appropriate language so that lay people can understand 
them. Communities should know about disaster risks and be informed 
about what to do and what to do if a disaster occurs. In the same way, non-
governmental organizations could also act in the defense of workers and 
communities, both informing them about risks, and on prevention actions 
and post-disaster actions (JASANOFF, 1988, p. 1113-1123). 
In this regard, mention should be made of the United Nations 
Special Report on Cultural Rights, in which Farida Shaheed suggests that 
the right to science encompasses four distinct elements: the right of access 
to the benefits of science by all without discrimination; the opportunity for 
all to contribute to scientific research; the obligation to protect all people 
against the negative consequences of scientific research on food, health, 
safety and the environment; and the obligation to ensure that scientific 
priorities focus on research on key issues for the most vulnerable (UNGA, 
2011). Therefore, this passage is intimately related to the right to know, 
since the vulnerability of those affected in the disaster should have been a 
priority in the company’s action, through the disclosure of clear and correct 
information. 
In addition, the information should become public, especially 
when this responsibility is divided among several actors, enabling the 
people involved to appeal, question and charge. In the case of Bhopal, it 
was shown that the line of communication between operators and those 
who should have the information about the products handled at the plant 
was very tenuous. Soon after the disaster, the United States voted against 
a UN resolution on the compilation of banned or restricted products in 
several countries. This demonstrated that the policies of action in Bhopal 
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were built on the policies of the US-based multinational, without regard to 
local peculiarities (JASANOFF, 1988, p. 1113-1123). 
With this, we have lacked integration and communication 
between the actors, so that Bhopal ended up being the result of total lack 
of care of those involved, which greatly affected the already vulnerable 
community and extends its harmful effects of the leak until today, after 
more than 30 years. 
Manfredi argues that limited liability leads to inefficiencies in 
outsourcing costs (disasters). The risk of a financial activity depends on 
the degree of variability of the possible outcomes. The greater the degree 
of variability, the greater the risk. So when investors decide whether an 
investment is positive and how much they would be willing to pay for 
it, they should evaluate the possible future results, both positive and 
negative. Thus, one factor influences the understanding of externalities: 
these arise from the only limited liability of the shareholders, since they 
lead to inefficient behavior, with little incentive to avoid potential disasters, 
given the limitation of compensation to the victims, when processing their 
shareholders (MANFREDI, 2017). 
Finally, regarding what should be known to people, in the case 
of Bhopal, the toxicity aptitude of the MIC should have been reported2. 
Harmful consequences to victims could have been minor, physicians could 
have acted more efficiently in treatment (JASANOFF, 1988, p. 1113-1123). 
Guzman believes that assessing hazards, vulnerability and risks, 
structures the estimation and identification of risks, their likelihood of 
occurrence and consequences. These data, analyzed in conjunction with 
existing or potential vulnerabilities, give estimates to decide whether it 
is desirable to reduce probabilities to protect people and the environment 
(GUZMAN, 2002). 
In Bhopal’s case, it was necessary to know: (i) how many people 
could die if a major accident occurred in Bhopal; ii) that the disaster could 
be worse if the weather conditions were unfavorable; iii) the need to carry 
out an environmental impact study prior to the receipt of a governmental 
permit for construction and hazardous installations; (iv) the need to conduct 
studies on potential damage to plants and animals, soil and food and water 
supply, in the short, medium and long term (JASANOFF, 1988, p. 1113-
1123). 
2  Acronym for methyl isocyanate in English, as explained above.
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Taking the above into account, the main lesson of Bhopal is 
that the risk of industrial catastrophe can be reduced only if knowledge 
is combined with preventive action. However, in the case, the knowledge 
did not accompany its transference to India. The company used the site’s 
vulnerability to gain advantages. (JASANOFF, 1988, p. 1113-1123). In 
this sense, the Bhopal example should serve to address the discriminatory 
prevention of results, by prioritizing the needs of the vulnerable and 
protecting against the negative consequences of technology transfer 
(MORGERA; NTONA, 2017). 
Thus, a challenge for right-to-know policies is to bridge 
information gaps and communication gaps that may arise in the course 
of technology transfer. The design of the new right-to-know laws for 
transferred technologies should be a major concern; in addition to being 
more systematic, it is necessary to cover more the risks. In addition, 
probabilistic risk assessment and environmental impact analysis should 
be made as prerequisites for the deployment of hazardous facilities 
(MORGERA; NTONA, 2017). 
In addition, importing countries have to build a technical and 
administrative infrastructure capable of generating and transmitting 
information for risk control. In order to expand this partial view, importers, 
consumers and potential victims of technology have to arm themselves 
with knowledge so that they can judge the adequacy of the different 
technological options. 
At the 20-year Anniversary Conference of the Bhopal Disaster 
in 2004, the following recommendations were made: a) “that information 
about the disaster should be publicly known, as it relates to the causes of 
the disaster and the deaths, in the weeks, months and years since 1984 “; 
b) “the lessons of Bhopal should be subject in the courses of Engineering, 
Medicine and Economics,” before its importance as a model to be followed; 
c) that “countries that do not have advanced technology should be very 
concerned about the execution of the operations, creating command and 
control instruments and economic instruments in order to implement safe 
production plans”; d) that “governments should create public policies 
and conditions in order to inform the population about the risks and not 
to establish their residences near industries”; e) that “industries should 
demonstrate safety concerns at all levels of the operation” and “prepare 
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contingency plans and evacuation of the population living near the factory, 
as well as informing local communities about appropriate responses on 
the release of the substance “; f) that “the community should be aware of 
potential hazards and familiarize themselves with appropriate emergency 
response practices” (LABANCA, 2010). 
In 2005, the Government of India also enacted the Right to 
Information Act to allow citizens to access information under the control 
of public authorities in order to increase transparency and accountability in 
governance (DEVA, 2012). 
UNESCO (MELDEL, 2009) also proposed principles of the right 
to information, with the right to know: 
PRINCIPLE 1 - MAXIMUM DISCLOSURE. Freedom of information legislation 
should be guided by the principle of maximum disclosure;
 
PRINCIPLE 2 - OBLIGATION TO PUBLISH. Public bodies should be obliged to 
publish essential information;
 
PRINCIPLE 3 - PROMOTION OF OPEN GOVERNMENT. Public agencies need to 
actively promote the opening of government; 
 
PRINCIPLE 4 - LIMITED SCOPE OF EXCEPTIONS. Exceptions must be clearly 
and strictly defined and subject to rigorous “harm” and “public interest”; 
 
PRINCIPLE 5 - PROCEDURES THAT FACILITATE ACCESS. Requests 
for information must be processed promptly and fairly, with the possibility of 
independent examination if there is a refusal; 
 
PRINCIPLE 6 - COSTS. People should not be prevented from making inquiries 
because of the high costs involved; 
 
PRINCIPLE 7 - OPEN MEETINGS. Meetings of public bodies shall be open to the 
public;
 
PRINCIPLE 8 - DISCLOSURE HAS PRECEDENCE. Laws that are not in 
accordance with the principle of maximum disclosure should be reviewed or revoked;
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PRINCIPLE 9 - PROTECTION FOR DENOUNCERS. Individuals who bring to the 
public information about illicit acts - the complainants - need to be protected. 
 
Equally, an important recommendation is that adaptation plans 
should prioritize the most vulnerable, that is, places with less developed 
infrastructure, commonly in underdeveloped countries. In disaster 
risk management, these sites should be designed and implemented 
with significant involvement of all societies. Issues of inequality and 
environmental justice must be associated with impact and adaptation 
studies for disaster prevention (PROGRESS REPORT, 2010). 
 
CONCLUSION
 
The Bhopal disaster caused the deaths of thousands of people; 
contamination of soil, air and water; demonstrated the inefficiency of 
justice in responding to victims; has shown that the irresponsible transfer 
of technologies between developed and developing countries causes harm 
to the populations of these countries, as it does not respect the social, 
economic and cultural differences between them, whether in its operation 
or after the closure of activities. 
In this sense, the operations occurred without the proper training 
of workers and supervisors, as well as without information (minimums that 
are) to the workers and the population, regarding what was happening in 
the enterprise. This transfer of technology and risk is the portrait of society 
at risk, a complex society in which the damage from industrialization 
spreads in space and perpetuates itself over time. In this sense, disasters 
do not have a single cause, but are a consequence of the combination of 
several facts that combine, generate the irradiation and feedback of their 
causes and done polyontexically. 
The problem proposed for this article was to analyze the 
justification of the investigation of the risk and the right to know before 
technological development and its harmful consequences, when technology 
transfer between states. In this sense, the solution hypothesis was confirmed, 
therefore, the current society, according to the systemic theory of Niklas 
Luhmann, is a society marked by complexity and its systemic risks. This 
model of society does not control the magnitude of the damage in the event 
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of a disaster, especially in the case under study, when technology transfer 
between states did not address local vulnerabilities and knowledge. Thus, 
in the case analyzed, in order to reduce the damage caused by disasters, the 
right to know is of exponential importance, allowing the dissemination of 
information to possible risk targets. 
Therefore, as it was explained, if the dissemination of information 
on the risks involved in the transferred technology were prioritized, disaster 
damage could have been avoided, mitigated and repaired more efficiently. 
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